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No-Fly Zones: The Imposition And
Enforcement Of Air Exclusion Regimes
Over Bosnia And Iraq
TIMOTHY P. MCILMAIL*
I. INTRODUcTION
Air exclusion zones ("no-fly zones") prohibit the entry of
unauthorized aircraft into airspace over specified territory. No-fly
zones currently exist in the following regions: (1) over Bosnia,'
(2) over northern Iraq,2 and (3) over southern Iraq.' Within the
airspace of these zones, aircraft of foreign states have destroyed
local aircraft. These no-fly zones have become an important tool
of international law and conflict management, and have wide-
ranging legal, military, and political implications.
No-fly zones have permitted outside powers to intervene in
dangerous conflict areas with relatively little risk. They allow
highly industrialized and technologically superior powers to take
advantage of their virtual monopoly over combat aircraft and anti-
air defense systems to project power over territory defended
mostly by ground forces. Furthermore, no-fly zones have helped
the United Nations deliver critical humanitarian assistance to
besieged populations. They have also enabled the states that
enforce the zones to conduct airborne reconnaissance and
intelligence gathering unrelated to the purpose of excluding
* Timothy P. MclImail, J.D., George Washington University, 1994. This Article is
dedicated to my wife, Joan, and our baby expected in December.
1. Paul Lewis, U.N. Bans Flights in Bosnia But Is Silent on Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1992, at L3.
2. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Warns Against Attack By Iraq On Kurdish Refugees, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at A10.
3. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Thinks Iraq Prepares For Big Push on the Shiites, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1992, at A6.
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prohibited aircraft.4 Their most significant impact is that they
have permitted a coalition of states to deprive another state-
Iraq-of a large measure of its territorial sovereignty. The
existence of no-fly zones raises serious questions of international
law in general and international humanitarian law in particular.
This Article will examine the legality of the imposition and
enforcement of both the Bosnian and Iraqi no-fly zones, and
criticize their value as legal models for future air exclusion efforts.
Part II of this Article examines the regime of United Nations
Charter ("Charter") law and United Nations Security Council5
("Security Council") resolutions regarding the Bosnian no-fly zone.
Part III analyzes the legal arguments that may justify the imposi-
tion and enforcement of the Iraqi no-fly zones, including the
Security Council Resolutions that emerged from the War to
Liberate Kuwait and its aftermath, the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention, special Permanent Member authority under Article
106 of the United Nations Charter, and the doctrine of belligerent
occupation. Part IV compares North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") enforcement of the Bosnian no-fly zone to the enforce-
ment of the Iraqi no-fly zones, and examines whether enforcement
of the zones complies with applicable rules of war. Finally, this
Article will conclude that, while the Bosnian no-fly zone is an
example of the ineffective enforcement of a legally imposed air
exclusion regime, the Iraqi zones represent the effective enforce-
ment of illegally imposed air exclusion zones.
4. Joseph B. Treaster, U.S. Jets Fly Dry Runs on Iraq Targets to Show "We're Home",
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at A9.
5. The U.N. Charter states:
The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations.
The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics , the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States
of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General
Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-
permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in
the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the
maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the
Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.
U.N. CHARTER art. 23, 1 1 (1963 text) [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER]. In 1991, the Russian
Federation replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Security Council and
all other United Nations organs. U.N. DAG HAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARY, INDEX TO
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURIrY COUNCIL, 1992, at 135, U.N. Doc. ST/LIB/SER.B/S.28,
U.N. Sales No. E.92.I.12 (1992).
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II. The Case of Bosnia
In April 1992, fighting in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina.6 Bosnia and Herzegovina,
ethnically divided between Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, proclaimed
its independence in early 1992. The Yugoslav National Army and
Bosnian Serbs launched an armed offensive against the Muslim-
dominated Bosnian government in Sarajevo to force Bosnian
Muslims to abandon territory and to create a Greater Serbia ruled
from Belgrade.7
A. The Imposition of the Zone
1. Background
Throughout the summer and into the fall of 1992, the deterio-
rating situation in Bosnia caused Western States to intervene in
the Yugoslavian crisis.' The Security Council resolved to deliver
humanitarian assistance and authorized peacekeeping troops to aid
in the delivery of this assistance.9 The aircraft participating in the
humanitarian relief flights were exposed to anti-aircraft fire while
airborne, however, impeding the delivery of assistance."l In
addition to attacking humanitarian relief aircraft, Serbian air
forces, in control of Bosnian airspace, conducted bombing and
strafing operations against Bosnian Muslim forces and civilian
6. For a background of events leading up to hostilities throughout Yugoslavia, see
A Whirlwind of Hatreds: How the Balkans Broke Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at E5.
7. id.; Chuck Sudetic, Serbs Attack Muslim Slavs and Croats in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 1992, at L3.
8. Craig R. Whitney, Europe's Caution on Bosnia Provokes Growing Criticism, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1992, at L5.
9. Paul Lewis, U.N. Council Votes to Support Force in Assisting Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1992, at Al, A6.
10. In September 1992, the United Nations temporarily suspended relief flights after
an Italian relief plane was shot down, presumably by a Bosnian surface-to-air missile.
Chuck Sudetic, U.N. Relief Plane Reported Downed On Bosnia Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 1992, at Al, A6. A United States helicopter was hit by small-arms fire on a mission to
rescue the downed aircraft. Michael R. Gordon, Pentagon Says a Rescue Helicopter Was
Fired On in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at A3. There were also reports that
Serbian military aircraft "shadowed" relief flights in an attempt to avoid anti-aircraft fire
from ground forces. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Says Serbian Warplanes Use Relief Flights
as 'Cover', N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992, at A10.
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populations." These twin threats to humanitarian aid and peace
moved the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Bosnia
in October 1992.12
The Charter implicitly allows the imposition and enforcement
of no-fly zones. The Charter entrusts "primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security" to the
Security Council. 3 In performing this function, the Security
Council must abide by the "Principles of the United Nations,"14
11. Michael R. Gordon, Bush Backs A Plan On Combat Flights In Bosnia Airspace,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1992, at Al.
12. Lewis, supra note 1.
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
14. Article One of the Charter provides:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of interna-
tional disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the
attainment of these common ends.
Id. art. 1.
Article Two of the Charter provides:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of
all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and
benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any
action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from
giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking
preventative or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members
of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
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and, in the case of U.N.-chartered dispute settlement by regional
organizations, Chapters VII and VIII will govern."5
2. Article 39: Maintaining or Restoring the Peace.
Chapter VII provides the framework under which the Security
Council may act to maintain or restore international peace.
1 6
Article 39 allows the Security Council to decide whether action is
necessary "to maintain or restore international peace and securi-
ty."' 17  An Article 39 decision is a condition precedent to any
Security Council action to maintain or restore peace." Before
deciding to take action, the Security Council must first determine
that a situation threatens peace, has breached the peace, or
constitutes an act of aggression.19
The Security Council's adoption of Resolution 781 established
"a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia." 2  The
Resolution, however, did not claim Chapter VII as its source of
authority for this action, nor did it determine that a situation
threatened or breached international peace. Rather, the Resolu-
tion stated that the Security Council acted pursuant to the
provisions of Resolution 770.2" Nevertheless, the adoption of
Resolution 781 complied with the demands of Article 39.
Resolution 770 demanded that the parties to the war in Bosnia
cease their fighting and determined "that the situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina constitutes a threat to international peace and
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Id. art. 2.
15. Id. art. 24, 1 2.
16. For a brief overview of the mechanics of Chapter VII, see Derek Gilman,
Comment, The Gulf War and the United Nations: Did the Security Council Fulfill Its
Original Mission?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1131 (1992).
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
18. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294 (1950).
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 703 cmt. g (1987); 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR, AND NEUTRALITY 163 (Hesch Lauterpacht ed., 1952).
20. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781
(1992).
21. Id.
19941
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security."'  In adopting this Resolution, the Security Council,
expressly invoking its Chapter VII authority, called on states to
assist the United Nations with its effort to deliver humanitarian
assistance to Bosnia and decided to "remain actively seized of the
matter."'
The language of Resolution 781, including its specific reference
to Resolution 770, demonstrates that the Security Council viewed
a no-fly zone as necessary for "the safety of the delivery of
humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of
hostilities in Bosnia," the very goals of Resolution 770.24 The
Security Council imposed the no-fly zone as a means to implement
Resolution 770.25 Accordingly, Resolution 770 implicitly permits
the no-fly zone authorized by Resolution 781.
The Security Council possesses very broad discretion to
determine what constitutes a threat to international peace.26 Its
determination that the circumstances in the former Yugoslavia
constituted a threat to international peace was a proper exercise
of its Article 39 authority. The fighting in Bosnia was widely
regarded as a threat that could lead to general Balkan warfare.27
In addition, the deterioration of humanitarian conditions within
Bosnia created refugee problems for countries at its borders.2
22. S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/770
(1992).
23. Id. at 2.
24. S.C. Res. 781, supra note 20, at 2. In Resolution 770, the Security Council
recognized "that the pr6vision of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
an important element in the Council's effort to restore international peace and security in
the area." S.C. Res. 770, supra note 22, at 2.
25. S.C. Res. 781, supra note 20, at 2.
26. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (1990); see also
OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 163 (stating that the Security Council has broad
determination discretion); cf Mary Ellen O'Connell, Commentary on International Law:
Continuing Limits on Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903, 911 (1992) (stating that
although some commentators believe that "the Security Council need not find an actual
threat to international peace" to decide to take action, "[sihort of giving unlimited scope
to the concept of threat to the peace, there is no legal basis for" United Nations action).
27. See David Binder, U.S. Worries Balkan War Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1992, at L3.
28. Croatia, for example, found itself near the limits of its ability to deal with 650,000
Bosnian refugees by the summer of 1992. Stephen Kinzer, Croatian Aid Staggered By
Steady Refugee Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1992, at L18.
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The imposition of the no-fly zone over Bosnia, therefore, complied
with the requirements of Article 39.29
3. Article 41: Interruption
Resolution 781 did not specify which Article of the Charter
authorized the Security Council to establish the no-fly zone.
Pursuant to Article 40, however, the Security Council may, "[i]n
order to prevent an aggravation of the situation,. . . call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it
deems necessary or desirable., 3' An air exclusion zone might be
considered a "provisional measure" within the meaning of Article
40. The strong language of Resolution 781, however, is inconsis-
tent with the conciliatory language of Article 40. If the Security
Council fails to negotiate the maintenance or restoration of peace
and security through the application of Article 40, it must rely on
the stronger action authorized by Article 41.31 Article 41 pro-
vides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
32
One might argue that the imposition of a no-fly zone does not
constitute an "interruption" of air communication within the
meaning of Article 41. The Article relies on the non-military
cooperation of Member States to carry out its purposes. This
29. Even if the Council's action did not properly come within Chapter VII, the
imposition of the no-fly zone was arguably legal because the Bosnian government
consented. At a London meeting in September 1992, the parties to the Bosnian war
agreed to put their heavy weapons-arguably including aircraft-under United Nations
control. See Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. May Be Ready to Discuss Ban on Warplanes Over
Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,1992, at A14. The Security Council refers to this agreement
in Resolution 781. S.C. Res. 781, supra note 20, at 1. For analytical purposes, however,
this Article assumes that the no-fly zone over Bosnia is non-consensual.
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
31. See John Quigley, The United Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedent For Israel's
Arab Territories?, 2 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 195, 202 (1992). Article 39 of the U.N.
Charter provides: "[T]he Security Council ... shall ... decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42." U.N. CHARTER art. 39
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
1994]
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strongly suggests the interruption of civilian rather than military
traffic through the use of sanctions and embargoes, not by bans on
military aircraft.33
Article 41 nevertheless provides the needed authority for the
imposition of the no-fly zone. The language of Article 41 is
descriptive rather than prescriptive, 34 permitting measures that
may include the restriction of military traffic through airspace.
Accordingly, the Security Council, pursuant to Article 41, properly
exercised its power.
B. Enforcement
Serbian aircraft violated the no-fly zone immediately after its
imposition.35  Violations continued throughout 199236 and into
1993, 3 despite an October 199238 agreement by the Bosnian
Serbs to place their aircraft under United Nations supervision.
Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to deploy armed
forces to implement its decisions if the peaceful measures autho-
rized by Article 41 prove inadequate.39 Therefore, the Security
Council would have authority to aggressively enforce the no-fly
zone over Bosnia if the Council determined that the imposition of
the zone over Bosnia failed to sufficiently maintain international
peace, or that peaceful measures, such as negotiation, did not
result in compliance with the zone.
As a result of the violations of the no-fly zone and acting
pursuant to Article 42, the Security Council resolved to implement
33. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 167.
34. For a discussion of the mechanics of Article 41, see Oscar Schachter, United
Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 454 (1991).
35. Chuck Sudetic, Serbian Planes Said to Kill 19 After U.N. Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 1992, at L10.
36. Paul Lewis, Serbs Are Reported to Fly 18 Flights in Bosnia Despite U.N.'s Ban,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1992, at A8. Serbs violated the zone hundreds of times, using
helicopters and fixed-winged aircraft to transport troops and equipment, train pilots, and
bomb ground targets. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. May Seek the Use of Force To Stop Serbs'
Flights Over Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al, A12.
37. The U.S. State Department charged that Serbian aircraft conducted three bombing
raids on Muslim villages in eastern Bosnia in March 1993. David Crary, Serbs Maintain
Choke Hold on Muslim Enclave, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1993, at A34.
38. Paul Lewis, Bosnian Serbs' Forces Agree to Grounding of Military Planes, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1992, at A10.
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
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a more aggressive enforcement policy.' Several factors ham-
pered efforts to adopt a resolution, including the desire of peace
negotiators to reach a possible settlement,41 the concern of France
and the United Kingdom for the safety of their soldiers deployed
as peacekeepers in Bosnia,42 and Russia's reluctance to authorize
or permit military action against its traditional Serbian allies during
a constitutional and political crisis in Moscow. 3
Finally, in March 1993, nearly six months after imposing the no-
fly zone, the Security Council adopted Resolution 816." Resolu-
tion 816 extended the no-fly zone "to cover flights by all fixed-
wing and rotary-wing aircraft" except those authorized by the
United Nations. 45 Article 42 provides that the Security Council
may enforce this extension either through "forces of Members of
the United Nations," or through forces of the United Nations
Organization itself.'
1. Article 53: Regional Organization Enforcement
Chapter VII of the Charter establishes the framework for
enforcement of Security Council resolutions through regional
organizations. Under Article 53, the Security Council "shall,
where appropriate, utilize ... regional arrangements or agencies
for enforcement action under its authority."'47 Resolution 816
40. Paul Lewis, NATO to Help U.N. on Yugoslav Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992,
at A3 [hereinafter Lewis, NATO to Help U.N.]; Paul Lewis, U.N. Moving to Toughen
Yugoslav Flight Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1993, at All; Paul Lewis, U.N. About to Step
Up Action on Serbia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at A14. The United States declared that
Resolution 781 committed the Security Council to enforcing the no-fly zone in the case of
violations. Lewis, supra note 1, at L3.
41. David Binder, Vance Asks Bush for More Time for Bosnia Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1992, at L6.
42. See Alan Riding, France Opposes Air-Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A22;
Paul Lewis, U.N. Undecided on Action To Halt Fighting in Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
1992, at A8.
43. Paul Lewis, U.N. Postpones Enforcing Ban On Serb Flights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1993, at A3.
44. Paul Lewis, U.N. Approves Plan to Enforce Bosnia Flight Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
1, 1993, at A12.
45. S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/816
(1993).
46. Article 42 provides that the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Such action may include ... operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the
United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 42 (emphasis added).
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, 1.
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authorized "Member States, acting nationally or through regional
organizations" to take "all necessary measures ... to ensure
compliance" with the flight ban.' While the resolution did not
expressly refer to any specific regional organization, the Security
Council adopted it with NATO in mind.49 NATO agreed to
accept enforcement authority.
50
NATO could not have enforced the Bosnian no-fly zone
without the adoption of resolution 816. No Security Council
"enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements
or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council., 51  Because the Security Council imposed the no-fly
zone over Bosnia, only it may have authorized the zone's enforce-
ment.
Pursuant to Article 51, regional organizations may impose no-
fly zones within their own regions as a matter of collective self-
defense.52 Article 52 requires that regional organizations "make
every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes ...
before referring them to the Security Council."53  Once the
regional organization makes such a referral, however, the Security
Council may find that these efforts in fact constitute a threat to
international peace and, therefore, may order these organizations
to cease their efforts.' If the Security Council takes note of the
action and approves, or remains silent, the action may continue.55
This mechanism, however, does not apply to NATO's role in
48. S.C. Res. 816, supra note 45, at 2.
49. Lewis, supra note 44, at A12. The Security Council planned as early as December
1992 to enforce the zone through NATO. Lewis, NATO to Help U.N., supra note 40, at
A3.
50. Alan Riding, NATO Agrees to Enforce Flight Ban Over Bosnia Ordered by U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993, at A5. NATO could not have enforced the Bosnian no-fly zone
without the adoption of Resolution 816. No Security Council "enforcement action shall
be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization
of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 53, 1.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 53, I 1.
52. "[N]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations
.U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
53. Id. art. 52, 91 2.
54. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 156-57 (stating that a regional organization's
decision to act in self-defense is subject to Security Council review).
55. Schachter, supra note 34, at 471 (stating that the absence of Security Council
disapproval, but not express approval, is needed).
[Vol. 17:35
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Bosnia because Bosnia does not fall within NATO's regional
jurisdiction. 6
2. Article 42: Member State Enforcement
In addition to authorizing the deployment of armed forces,
Article 42 also permits the Security Council to enlist Member
Nations to enforce its decisions on its behalf. Security Council
"action may include ... operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations."57 The Security Council deter-
mines which Members are authorized to take such action.8
Member States acting outside of NATO could enforce the
Bosnian no-fly zone. Resolution 816 authorizes enforcement by
"Member States ... acting nationally or through regional organiza-
tions."59  Thus, a non-NATO state such as Russia may also
participate in enforcement of the no-fly zone.
3. Article 43: Security Council Enforcement
The Charter authorizes the Security Council to enforce the
Bosnian no-fly zone with its own forces. If the Security Council
chooses not to employ Member Nations' forces, it may nonetheless
take action through other "air, sea, or land forces."'  This
distinction between Member Nations' forces and non-Member
Nations' forces permits the formation of United Nations forces.
61
The aircraft the United Nations would use to enforce a no-fly zone
would consist of "national air-force contingents" made available to
the Security Council through Article 45.62
Under Article 43, Member Nations, when called on by the
Security Council, must provide forces to the Security Council
56. NATO's decision to enforce the Bosnian no-fly zone marked its first combat
mission outside NATO territory. See Riding, supra note 50, at A5.
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
58. "The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the
United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine." Id. art. 48,
1.
59. S.C. Res. 816, supra note 45, at 2.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
61. Id. arts. 42, 43. But c.f. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 169-71 (stating that there
is support for the view that the Charter does not contemplate the creation of such forces).
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 45.
1994]
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according to "special agreements."'  Because these agreements
require ratification, they differ from a "call" on a Member Nation
to take action with its own forces on the Security Council's
behalf.'
The Charter contemplates that these forces will be under the
direct political and military authority of the Security Council
itself.65 Article 46 provides: "Plans for the application of armed
force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of
the Military Staff Committee." This "Committee" consists of the
Chiefs of Staff of the permanent Members of the Security
Council.' This military committee would, therefore, direct
enforcement of the no-fly zone. 67
C. No-Fly Zones and State Sovereignty
Under treaty and customary international law, a state has
exclusive sovereignty over its own airspace.' Other states may
63. Article 43, paragraph 1, of the U.N. Charter states:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or
agreements, armed forces ... necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.
Id. art. 43, 1. See also Schachter, supra note 34, at 464 (stating that Article 43
agreements are not a "condition precedent" to the exercise of Security Council power
under Article 42).
64. Article 43, paragraph 3, of the U.N. Charter states:
The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members
and shall be subject to the ratification by the signatory states in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1 3.
65. Id. art. 46.
66. Article 47 of the U.N. Charter states that:
There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the
Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military
requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the
employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of
armaments, and possible disarmament.
Id. art. 47, 1 (emphasis added).
67. Article 47 states that "the Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the
Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of
the Security Council." Id art. 47, 3.
68. "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." Convention on International Civil
Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, ICAO 2 [hereinafter Chicago Convention); J.M. SPAIGHT,
AIR POWER AND WAR RIoHTs 400 (1947).
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only use this airspace with that state's consent. 69 Because a state
may impose flight restrictions over its own airspace,' a restriction
on flight imposed by an outside power impinges on that state's
sovereignty. Accordingly, the Bosnian no-fly zone acts as an
impingement on Bosnian sovereignty.
Article 2 provides that United Nations action normally may not
"intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.",71  This principle, however, does not
apply to "enforcement measures under Chapter VII" of the
Charter.' Because the Security Council explicitly acted pursuant
to Chapter VII when it imposed the no-fly zone and authorized its
enforcement, the zone did not violate the non-intervention
principle embodied in Article 2. Additionally, the Security Council
did not violate Article 2 because its action addressed issues of
human rights.7 States no longer possess sole authority to address
human rights violations;74 this authority is shared with and
controlled by the United Nations.
E. Summary
The Security Council's actions in Bosnia demonstrates the most
appropriate way to establish and enforce a no-fly zone. The six
month delay in enforcing the Bosnian no-fly zone strongly
indicates the level of states' understanding of what constitutes
lawful imposition and enforcement of a no-fly zone. The Security
Council, NATO, and the Western states involved in the negotia-
tions over enforcement believed that imposition and enforcement
of the Bosnian no-fly zone required the Security Council's specific
authorization. In October 1992, prior to the imposition of the
69. "No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State
or land thereon without the authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in
accordance with the terms thereof." Chicago Convention, supra note 67, at 1. See also
U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. AcTVrTEs, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 2-6 (1978) [hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS]
(stating that the Chicago Convention is inapplicable to military aircraft except for this
consent provision).
70. Chicago Convention, supra note 67, at 4.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 17.
72. Id.
73. See Christiane Bourloyannis, The Security Council of the United Nations and the
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335,352
(1992).
74. Id.
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zone, U.S. President George Bush declared "[i]f asked by the
U.N., the U.S. will participate in enforcement measures.,
75
NATO waited for specific authorization as well.
The absence of unilateral state action in the Bosnian case
reflects a straightforward principle governing no-fly zones: when
the Security Council imposes a no-fly zone, only the Security
Council may enforce it. Whether the Security Council possesses
the sole power to impose air exclusion zones largely depends on
an examination of those zones in place over Iraqi territory.
III. The Imposition of the Iraqi No-Fly Zones
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. In January 1991, a
Western-led coalition of states launched an attack to force Iraq to
withdraw. Kuwait was liberated in February 1991, and offensive
action ended in March 1991.76 A Security Council-approved
cease-fire began in April 1991.7 Thereafter, the Iraqi govern-
ment turned its forces against rebel uprisings among the Kurdish
population in the country's north and the Shiite population in the
south.78 On April 5, 1991, the Security Council condemned Iraq's
repression of its civilian population and demanded that such
repression cease.79  On April 10, 1991, the United States an-
nounced that France and the United Kingdom would join in the
imposition of a no-fly zone over Iraqi territory north of the 36th
parallel.' On August 19, 1992, the United States announced the
imposition of a second no-fly zone over Iraqi territory south of the
32nd parallel."
75. Bush's Bosnia Remarks: Halting a 'Cruel War', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992, at L5.
76. R.W. Apple, Jr., U.S. Says Iraqi Generals Agree to Demands 'On All Matters;
Early P.O.W. Release Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991, at Al.
77. Patrick E. Tyler, Bush Sees Accord On 'Safe Havens' for Kurds in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1991, at Al.
78. Paul Lewis, U.N. Votes to Condemn Handling of Iraqi Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 1991, at L5.
79. Id.
80. The zone also prohibited Iraqi ground forces from entering northern Iraq.
Sciolino, supra note 2, at A10.
81. Michael R. Gordon, British, French and U.S. Agree to Hit Iraqi Aircraft in the
South, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1992, at Al.
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A. Legal Justifications for the Coalition's Imposition of the No-
Fly Zones
The authority claimed by the Gulf-War coalition of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France ("Coalition") to impose
the Iraqi no-fly zones rests principally on an interpretation of
several Security Council resolutions adopted to address the
consequences of Iraqi military action both inside and outside
Iraq.' Alternative justifications, such as authority under Article
106, unilateral humanitarian intervention, or occupation authority
are examined below. These justifications, however, rest on shaky
legal grounds. This lack of international legal support undermines
the applicability of the Iraqi no-fly zone experience to future situa-
tions.
1. Authority Through Security Council Resolutions
a. Resolution 688: Response to Repression
After the Iraqi defeat of Kurdish rebels following the liberation
of Kuwait, waves of Kurdish refugees fled to snow-covered
mountains on Iraq's borders with Iran and Turkey.83 On April
10, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 688, 4 recogniz-
ing for the first time that "a massive flow of refugees towards and
across international frontiers ... threaten[s] international peace
and security."'85 The Security Council based this determination
on the fact that the presence of the refugees on Iraq's borders put
significant pressure on Turkey and Iran.86  Resolution 688
expressed concern for "the repression of the Iraqi civilian
population," particularly "in Kurdish populated areas."'  It
condemned the repression of Kurds and other civilians, found that
the repression posed a threat to international peace, and demand-
82. See Sciolino, supra note 2, at A10; Excerpts From Bush's Talk: Iraqi Air Zone Is
Off-Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at A14.
83. Alan Cowell, Kurds Fall Back from Iraq Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, at A8.
84. Lewis, supra note 77, at L5.
85. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991); see also James A.R. Nafziger, Self-Determination and Humanitarian Intervention
in a Community of Power, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9,29 (1992); Bourloyannis, supra
note 72, at 352.
86. See Clyde Haberman, Turkey Rejects Mass Entry of Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
1991, at All; Lewis, supra note 77, at L5.
87. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 84, at 579.
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ed that it end.' The Security Council also insisted that Iraq
permit the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian
population.'
The Coalition claimed that Resolution 688 authorized the
imposition of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq in order to force
compliance with the Security Council demand that Iraq stop
repressing its civilian population. 9° Resolution 688, however, did
not itself establish any flight ban. Nor did the Resolution autho-
rize Member States to enforce the demand that Iraq cease its
repression of civilians. The only Member State action it contem-
plated, except for its demands on Iraq, was an "appeal" for states
"to contribute to ... humanitarian relief efforts."
91
This language almost certainly contemplates material and
financial assistance, rather than state action to enforce a demand
to cease civilian repression. In fact, during negotiations regarding
Resolution 688, China opposed aggressive enforcement.' Other
resolutions dealing with Iraq, however, clearly reflect the practice
the Security Council follows when authorizing Member States to
enforce its decisions. Standard features of those resolutions
include: (1) a specific invocation of Chapter VII authority, (2) an
"authorization" of Member States' action, and (3) the use of the
term "all necessary means" to indicate authority to use force.
93
Resolution 688 contains none of these elements. It is clear,
therefore, that Resolution 688 alone does not justify the Coalition's
no-fly zones.94
88. Id. at 1-2.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Sciolino, supra note 2, at A10.
91. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 84, at 2.
92. See Paul Lewis, Europeans Back Off Plan to Help Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1991, at A12 (discussing the Security Council's refusal to include an enforcement
provision); O'Connell, supra note 26, at 903, 906.
93. In Resolution 678, for example, the Security Council "[a]cting under Chapter VII
of the [U.N.] Charter ... [a]uthorizes Member States ... to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement resolution 660." S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg.,
at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRES/678 (1990). See No-Fly in Iraq- Why?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1992,
at A24 (noting that the term "all necessary means" has come to mean the use of force).
94. O'Connell, supra note 26, at 907. Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention In
Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MiCH. J. INT'L L. 519, 549 n.164 (1994).
[Vol. 17:35
No-Fly Zones
b. Resolution 678: Restoration of Peace
The Coalition did not rely exclusively on Resolution 688 when
it imposed the no-fly zones over Iraq. The United States argued
that its authority to enforce Resolution 688 is derived from its
authority to prosecute the war to liberate Kuwait and to enforce
the terms of the cease-fire agreement.95
Resolution 678, adopted in November 1990, authorized
"Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait...
to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution
660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the area."' An analysis of the
argument that Resolution 678 grants authority to impose no-fly
zones to protect Iraqi civilians must examine the language of
Resolution 678, particularly the terms "subsequent relevant
resolutions" and "to restore international peace and security."
The first question is whether Resolution 688 is a "subsequent
relevant resolution" to Resolution 660, the Security Council's first
response to the invasion of Kuwait. 7  The argument may be
made that Resolution 688 follows Resolution 660 in numerical and
chronological terms. More significantly, Resolution 688 concerns
Iraq, and is, therefore, facially relevant to a contemporaneous
regime of resolutions dealing with Iraq. Additionally, because
Iraq's repression was the direct result of the war to liberate
Kuwait, the subject matter of Resolution 688-the protection of
Iraqi civilians-is directly relevant to Resolution 660 and its
progeny. Moreover, both Resolutions 660 and 688 refer to
"international peace and security" in the region. Thus, both
Resolutions reflect a concern for the effect that Iraq's actions will
have on neighboring states.
A more careful and reasonable interpretation, however, shows
that Resolution 688 does not pertain to Resolution 660 within the
meaning of Resolution 678. First, the term "relevant resolutions"
refers to those resolutions adopted by the Security Council after
the invasion of Kuwait and prior to the authorization of force to
95. Gordon, supra note 80, at Al, A6.
96. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 92, at 1.
97. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660
(1990).
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liberate Kuwait.98 These "relevant resolutions" addressed the
"breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait,"" the need to "restore the sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait,"' ' and the
"well being of third state nationals in Iraq and Kuwait."' 1
Neither of these "relevant resolutions" mentions concern for Iraqi
civilians or reprimands Iraq's repression of its civilians. Unlike
Resolution 688, these "relevant resolutions" refer back to Resolu-
tion 660.
Resolutions 660 and 688 do not address identical challenges to
international peace and security. In Resolution 660, the Security
Council determined that the invasion of Kuwait constituted "a
breach of international peace and security."' 2  The Security
Council adopted Resolution 678 "to restore" that peace.
0 3
Resolution 688, however, only determined that Iraqi actions
"threaten[ed] international peace and security."'" Because the
determinations declared in resolutions 660 and 688 are distinct, the
chosen action must be distinct as well. Resolution 678, which
authorizes force to "restore international peace,"' 5 does not
justify force to "maintain international peace." A contrary conclu-
sion ignores the clear difference in the language of the two
Resolutions. °"
c. Resolutions 686 and 687: Cease-Fire Agreement
The no-fly zone is also justified because it constitutes part of
the cease-fire agreement that ended the war to liberate Kuwait.
Resolution 686 set the terms for a formal cease-fire, including a
demand that Iraq "[c]ease hostile or provocative actions by its
98. The Security Council recalled and reaffirmed Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665,
666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 677. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 92, at 1.
99. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 96, at 1.
100. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661
(1990).
101. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664
(1990).
102. S.C. Res. 660, supra note 96, at 1.
103. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 92, at 1.
104. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 84, at 1.
105. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 92, at 1.
106. But see Bums H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf
Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 525 (1991) (stating that
the term "international peace and security" is open to flexible interpretation when used
in combination with ambiguous language in other resolutions).
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forces against all Member States, including missile attacks and
flights of combat aircraft."' 7 This language, in effect, established
a no-fly zone around Coalition aircraft whenever and wherever the
aircraft flew over Iraq. In fact, before the cease-fire went into
effect, the United States informed Iraq that the use of helicopters
to attack rebels violated Resolution 686.'08
A closer examination of Resolution 686, however, reveals that
it imposed a very limited restriction on Iraqi aircraft. First, it
demanded that Iraq cease missile and combat aircraft attacks
against Coalition forces, not against Iraqi civilians. Thus, the
language of Resolution 686 contemplates the presence of Coalition
aircraft in Iraqi airspace. When the Security Council adopted
Resolution 686, Coalition aircraft flew in Iraqi airspace because of
military activities authorized by the Security Council. Resolution
686 contemplated an end to these activities by offering Iraq cease-
fire terms.
Presumably, the end of Security Council-authorized military
activity would have terminated the authority that allowed Coalition
aircraft to enter Iraqi airspace that would have, in effect, terminat-
ed this temporary no-fly zone. Otherwise, Resolution 686 would
impose an indefinite prohibition on Iraq's customary right to
respond to intrusions by aircraft into its sovereign airspace.'" A
more reasonable interpretation is that Resolution 686 banned Iraqi
attacks on Coalition aircraft flying in Iraqi airspace until a formal
end of hostilities.
On April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687,
which set conditions for a formal cease fire."0  Iraq accepted
those conditions on April 16, 1991."' On April 11, the Security
Council acknowledged that a cease-fire had gone into effect."
107. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1990).
108. See Neil A. Lewis, U.S. and Iraq to Meet on Request By Baghdad to Shift its
Warplanes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1991, at Al, A17.
109. See Major John T. Phelps, Aerial Intrusions by Civil and Military Aircraft in Time
of Peace, 107 MIL. L. REV. 255, 291 (1985).
110. Paul Lewis, U.N. Votes Stern Conditions For Formally Ending War; Iraqi Response
Is Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al, A10; S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
2981st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
111. Alan Cowell, Baghdad Formally Agrees to "Unjust" U.N. Conditions for Permanent
Cease Fire: Truce Now Official, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, at Al, A14.
112. United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating To The Situation Between
Iraq And Kuwait, U.N. Department of Public Information, at 3, U.N. Doc.
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The cease-fire conditions imposed upon Iraq by Resolution 687
included a demand that Iraq respect the inviolability of its
boundary with Kuwait and provided for the demarcation of that
border by the United Nations.113 The Resolution also required
the elimination of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.'14
The Coalition has argued that Resolution 687 grants it
continuing authority to enforce the cease-fire conditions and that
if Iraq violates those conditions, the cease-fire agreement becomes
ineffective. The nullification of the cease-fire agreement would
permit the Coalition to exercise the broad military powers granted
to it by previous resolutions.
This persuasive argument supported by the language of
Resolution 687. Resolution 687 affirms Resolutions 660, 678, and
686, "except as expressly changed ... to achieve the goals of'
Resolution 687."' Broadly interpreted, Resolution 687 grants to
the Coalition power to take military action to force Iraq to cooper-
ate with United Nations disarmament procedures, to respect
Kuwaiti territorial integrity, and to comply with other conditions
of the cease-fire agreement. This power would permit the
Coalition to establish a temporary no-fly zone to protect Coalition
aircraft, which are present in Iraq in order to enforce the provi-
sions of Resolution 686, or a more permanent no-fly zone under
Resolution 678's "all necessary means" authority.
Indeed, this argument supports the U.S. action to counter Iraqi
troop movements toward Kuwait in October 1994.116 Arguably,
the Coalition had the authority to take action against Kuwait to
punish cease-fire violations since the end of the Gulf War because
Iraq had refused to recognize Kuwaiti sovereignty or the United
Nations' demarcated border.
11 7
Although this argument may provide legal justification for
Coalition military action against Iraq to enforce provisions of the
DPI/104IRev.3-41183 (1991).
113. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 109, at 4.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id. at 4.
116. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Sends Force As Iraq Soldiers Threaten Kuwait, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Gordon, U.S. Continuing Buildup]; Michael R.
Gordon, U.S. Continuing Buildup, Sees Signs of Iraqi Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994,
at Al; Barbara Crossette, Head of U.N. Inspection Team Says Baghdad Threatens
Weapons-Monitoring Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1994, at A8.
117. Barbara Crossette, Russia and Iraq Work Out Plan to Ease Gulf Tension, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14,1994, at A8.
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cease-fire agreement, it does not justify the imposition of no-fly
zones to protect Iraqi civilians. First of all, the cease-fire agree-
ment does not contain a provision for this purpose. Second, each
zone is either geographically or temporarily divorced from the
events that surrounded the cease-fire agreement. For example,
although the northern Iraqi no-fly zone was established when the
cease-fire agreement was executed, it covers an area far from the
industrial centers of both Kuwait and Iraq and neither protects
Kuwait nor assists in disarming Iraq. Linking the southern Iraqi
no-fly zone to the cease-fire agreement is a particularly weak legal
argument because this zone was imposed more than fifteen months
after the formal end of hostilities and exempted the armored
forces that most threaten Kuwait." 8
Even the most broad interpretation of the cease-fire agreement
does not permit the Coalition to patrol Iraqi airspace indefinitely
in order to protect Iraqi civilians. Such a suspension of Iraqi
sovereignty unduly strains the meaning of Resolutions 660, 678,
and 687 and threatens to undermine respect for Security Council
resolutions in general.
Nevertheless, the Coalition's legal strategy consistently aims to
blur the distinction between the demand to end civilian repression
contained in Resolution 688 and the cease-fire conditions imposed
by Resolution 687. Evidence of this strategy can be found in the
Coalition's approach toward sanctions imposed by Resolutions 661
and 687."' In early 1993, for example, the United States no
longer conditioned its vote in the Security Council to lift the
sanctions upon the removal of Saddam Hussein. 2 ° Nevertheless,
because Iraq continued to violate the cease-fire agreement,
Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that the United
States would continue to "try to ensure that the United Nations
resolutions are lived up to [by maintaining sanctions]."'2 The
United States believed that these resolutions required participation
in the boundary commission established by the agreement,
118. Daniel Williams, US., in Easing Pressure on Iraq, Feared Coalition Breakup and
Shiite State, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1994, at A34.
119. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 99; S.C. Res. 687, supra note 109.
120. See Paul Lewis, US. and Britain Softening Emphasis on Ousting Iraqi, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 1993, at A3.
121. Id.
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cooperation with the United Nations weapons inspectors, and
demanded an end to repression of Kurds and Shiites.22
By late 1993, the United States and the United Kingdom
adopted a more sophisticated position, arguing that continued Iraqi
compliance with the cease fire agreement could not be ensured
while Saddam Hussein remained in power because Hussein's
continued repression of Kurds and Shiites proved that Iraq could
not be trusted to honor the disarmament and inspection provisions
of the agreement.13
This approach was also evident during the late 1994 troop
movement crisis. President Clinton declared, "Saddam Hussein
has shown the world before ... that he cannot be trusted. Iraq's
troop movements ... are more proof of this .... [T]he sanctions
will be maintained until Iraq complies with all relevant U.N.
resolutions.""' 4 The United States linked a planned new demili-
tarized zone in southern Iraq to both the southern no-fly zone and
"existing Security Council resolutions." The no-troop zone was
described as an extension of the no-fly zone." The United
States appeared to define this new zone as all of Iraq below the
32nd parallel, the same territory bounded by the no-fly zone.
126
The United States also claimed it had the authority to strike Iraqi
forces within Iraq under then existing resolutions.127 These
events indicate that the United States, pursuant to the Security
Council resolutions it claimed authorized the no-fly zones, believed
it had authority to establish a "no-troop" zone.
Although the United States claimed sufficient authority existed
for its actions, the United States nevertheless sought Security
Council adoption of a resolution specifically authorizing a no-troop
zone for southern Iraq." The adopted resolution was less
sweeping than the United States desired and only demanded an
Iraqi withdrawal of elite troops back to their previous location.
122. Lewis, supra note 119, at A3.
123. Paul Lewis, U.S. Is Hardening Its Stand On Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19,1993, at Al.
124. Transcript of Clinton's Address: No Evidence the Iraqis Have Pulled Back, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1994, at A8.
125. Gordon, U.S. Continuing Buildup, supra note 115, at A10.
126. Michael R. Gordon, Perry Reports Elite Iraq Army Is Set to Retreat, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1994, at Al.
127. David Brown, Christopher Says 'Saddam Has Been Put on Notice', WASH. POST,
Oct. 17, 1994, at All; Crossette, supra note 116, at A16.
128. Barbara Crossette, U.S. Is Demanding A Quick U.N. Vote On Iraq Pullback, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1994, at Al.
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Furthermore, this resolution did not authorize the use of force to
ensure compliance. 29
The unanimous vote to adopt the resolution was marked by
disagreement among Permanent Members and the Coalition."
France disagreed with the United States and Britain over whether
the Coalition possessed the authority to attack Iraq.13' Russia
also asserted that the resolution did not authorize the use of force
if Iraq failed to comply.132 This disagreement regarding interpre-
tation, as well as on the decision to seek a Security Council vote
in the first place, further demonstrates the uncertainty of the
legitimacy of the Iraq no-fly zones.
The Coalition did not seek Security Council authority when it
established the southern no-fly zone, arguing that it already had
sufficient authority. The Coalition, however, sought Security
Council approval before attempting to establish a no-troop zone,
a purpose much more directly connected to the resolutions argued
to support the no-fly zones. Although the United States claimed
the new resolution strengthened its authority,1 33 the events of
October 1994 may indicate the erosion of the Coalition's confi-
dence in its authority to take military action under the cease-fire
agreement. If the Coalition cannot ban elite Iraqi troops from
near the Kuwaiti border without a supporting Security Council
resolution, it cannot legally ban Iraqi aircraft from Iraqi airspace.
While Coalition strategy might constitute an effective diplomat-
ic policy, it lacks sound legal basis. The cease-fire agreement does
not end civilian repression. Essentially, this strategy, which blurs
the distinction between the cease-fire agreement and the unrelated
Security Council Resolution 688, enables the Coalition to claim
that its no-fly zones are justified by a regime of authorized
inspection and sanction activity.
The Coalition's diplomatic success thus far with these argu-
ments is evident in the absence of state protest over the no-fly
129. Barbara Crossette, U.S. Is Compromising on Measure Chastising Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1994, at A12 [hereinafter Crossette, US. Is Compromising]; Barbara Crossette,
U.N. Council Unanimous In Condemning Iraq Move, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A10.
130. Crossette, supra note 116, at A16; Crossette, US. Is Compromising, supra note
128, at A12.
131. Crossette, U.S. Is Compromising, supra note 128, at A12.
132. Steven Greenhouse, US. Says Iraq Appears to Resume Pullback from Kuwait
Border, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A7.
133. Brown, supra note 126, at All.
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zones. Moreover, the Security Council has taken no action against
the zones. Later Security Council Resolutions contribute to the
blurring of issues by referring to Resolutions 686, 687, and 688
together, as if they constitute one single resolution.13- The
Coalition might argue that by referring to Resolution 688 without
condemning the Coalition's no-fly zones135 the Security Council
impliedly ratified the no-fly zones.
This argument calls for unreasonable speculation. The Security
Council has never been called upon to consider the legality of the
Iraqi no-fly zones.136 Furthermore, if called upon to do so, the
Security Council members in the Coalition could veto any
resolution adopted to condemn the zones as illegal. Reliance on
Security Council condemnation to signify illegality would mean
that no Permanent Member action could ever be illegal because
the offending Permanent Member may always veto a condemna-
tion." Such a rule would disregard the traditional roles of
treaty and customary law. International treaty and customary law,
as well as Security Council resolutions, should determine the
legality of Permanent Member action.
d. Summary
The international community has an important interest in
predictable and reasonable interpretations of Security Council
resolutions. The tortuous interpretations necessary to find
justification indicate that the Iraqi no-fly zones have no basis in
the resolutions relied upon by the Coalition.
1 38
134. S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES7O6
(1991); S.C. Res. 712, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3008th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. SIRESI712
(1991).
135. S.C. Res. 706, supra note 133, at 2.
136. See Michael R. Gordon, NATO Jets in Bosnia Told to Fire as Last Resort, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at A8.
137. The influence of the United States as the only remaining superpower makes its
actions less likely to be condemned by the Security Council, or subjected to international
disapproval. For a discussion of the present-day hegemony of the United States in the
Security Council and The United Nations generally, see John Quigley, Missiles with a
Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on Iraq's Intelligence Headquarters, 17
HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REv. 241, 273 (1994).
138. Remarks of international legal scholars at the 1991 American Association of
International Law annual meeting illustrate that the resolutions are not seen as strong
authority for the no-fly zones. See Neil A. Lewis, Legal Scholars Debate Refugee Plan,
Generally Backing U.S. Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at A8.
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If the Security Council wished to establish a no-fly zone to
protect the Kurds, it could have drafted language to reflect that
intent. The fact that the Security Council chose to establish and
enforce the Bosnian zone in such a different manner indicates that
the Iraqi zones exemplify poor Security Council resolution
interpretation. If these no-fly zones are not outright illegal, they
may be sui generis.139
2. Article 106: Permanent Member Authority
Article 106 of the Charter may provide authority for the
Coalition's no-fly zones." °  Article 106 permits enforcement of
Security Council decisions by Permanent Members acting in
coalition.141 The Security Council may exercise Article 106
authority only if it has not concluded Article 43 agreements or
determined that it is otherwise capable of enforcing its deci-
sions.1 42  Once the Security Council concludes such "special
agreements" or claims the capacity to enforce its decisions, such
authority vanishes.143  Thus far, no such agreements or declara-
tions have been made.144
139. There was muted but immediate international criticism of the coalition's
enforcement of the zones. William E. Schmidt, Iraq Says It is Ready to Fight Allies over
Air Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at A14. Iraq labeled the Coalition action an "unjust,
hostile decision." William E. Schmidt, Iraq Fires Words, but No Missiles, at Allied Planes,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1992, at A8. Other observers suggested that the link between
Resolutions 688 and 678 were "strained," especially in light of previous specific Security
Council authorization under Chapter VII of states' or coalitions' military action. No-Fly
In Iraq-Why?, supra note 92, at A24.
140. Article 106 of the U.N. Charter provides:
Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article
43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its
responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration,
signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as
occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such
joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose
of maintaining international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 106. For a brief and helpful discussion of the mechanics of Article
106, see Gilman, supra note 16, at 1139-45.
141. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 171-72; Gilman, supra note 16, at 1139
n.58.
142. Gilman, supra note 16, at 1139 n.58.
143. KELSEN, supra note 18, at 758.
144. Gilman, supra note 16, at 1138.
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a. Threat Determination
Article 106 action must be "necessary for the maintenance of
international peace." '145 Article 106, however, does not specify
which entities may determine that a threat to the peace exists.
Despite this uncertainty, the argument may be made that the
Security Council must determine that a threat to the peace exists
before Article 106 action may be taken."4 Due to the non-
existence of Article 43 special agreements, Article 106 only applies
when the Security Council cannot act under Article 42.147 Nei-
ther article concerns the Security Council's ability to determine the
existence of a threat to international peace.
Threat determination is the Security Council's responsibility
under Article 39.14' Article 106 does not specifically supplant the
Security Council's role in determining the existence of threats to
international peace. Moreover, the absence of Article 43 special
agreements does not abrogate that responsibility. Therefore,
Article 106 action should require a prior Security Council determi-
nation that a threat to international peace exists.
Article 106 imposes an affirmative duty upon the Permanent
Members to oversee the maintenance of international peace.1
49
Once the Security Council determines that a threat to peace exists,
and that it is authorized to act to maintain the peace, the Perma-
nent Members must work together to maintain the peace.
b. Article 106 in Practice
Once the Security Council makes the initial determination that
a threat to peace exists, the Permanent Members have independent
authority to act and may use armed force. 5 Arguably, then, the
Permanent Members can independently enforce Security Council-
imposed no-fly zones. Additionally, one could argue that they may
145. U.N. CHARTER art. 106.
146. Gilman, supra note 16, at 1142-43. But see KELSEN, supra note 18, at 761 (stating
that joint action is not subject to a threat determination by the Security Council).
147. Gilman, supra note 16, at 1142 n.80.
148. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
149. As long as the Security Council is unable to enforce its resolutions, the Permanent
Members "shall ... consult with one another.. . with a view to such joint action ... as
may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." U.N.
CHARTER art. 106.
150. KELSEN, supra note 18, at 761.
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also determine that the maintenance of international peace
requires the imposition and enforcement of a no-fly zone even
without imposition of a zone by the Security Council.
Once Permanent Members decide to act under Article 106,
they do so "on behalf of' the United Nations.51 As such, the
Permanent Members act with all of the Organization's powers and
obligations. Therefore, once the Permanent Members act under
Article 106, other Member Nations must assist their efforts.
1 2
Permanent Member action under Article 106 must be joint
action and may only commence after Permanent Membership
consultation.1 53  Although military action requires unanimous
consent by the Permanent Members,"4 a Permanent Member
may decline to take an active role.'
In August 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 665,
authorizing Member States "to use such measures commensurate
to the specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt" all
shipping into and out of Iraq and occupied Kuwait.5 6 One
commentator argues that Resolution 665 implicitly authorized
Article 106 military action by the Permanent Members.157  All
five Permanent Members ratified Resolution 665 and agreed that
the use of force was necessary to restore peace. In the absence of
Article 43 agreements, the action may be seen as an exercise of
Permanent Members' Article 106 authority.
A similar analysis shows that Resolution 688, demanding an
end to Iraqi repression of civilians, was not an exercise of Article
106 authority. 58  Because China abstained from voting, the
Permanent Members did not unanimously share concern for the
151. U.N. CHARTER art. 106; see also KELSEN, supra note 18, at 92, 761.
152. "All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para. 5; see also KELSEN, supra note 18, at 761; OPPENHEIM, supra note
19, at 172.
153. U.N. CHARTER art. 106; Gilman, supra note 16, at 1144.
154. See KELSEN, supra note 18, at 759 (stating that "the interpretation which seems
to be most plausible is that all five Powers must agree."); OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at
172 (stating that unanimity is required).
155. Gilman, supra note 16, at 1144 (stating that Article 106 authority requires
unanimity of purpose, but not of participation, among the Permanent Members).
156. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665
(1990).
157. Gilman, supra note 16, at 1150-53.
158. S.C. Res. 688, supra note 84, at 1.
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protection of Iraqi civilians.159 The fact that Resolution 688 did
not contain an enforcement mechanism reflects the disagreement
among the Permanent Members as to whether protection of Iraqis
required military force. Under a strict analysis of Article 106, the
Coalition had no independent authority to impose and enforce the
no-fly zones.
Under a more flexible analysis, however, Article 106 could
justify the no-fly zones. States have never invoked or rejected
Article 106."6 Given this lack of state practice, precise rules
governing the application of Article 106 do not yet exist. A more
flexible interpretation of Article 106 permits action without strict
unanimity of purpose among Permanent Members. Such an
interpretation could make Article 106 a viable solution to Security
Council paralysis.
Article 106 does not expressly require unanimity of purpose.
Rather, the Permanent Members must "consult with one another
... with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization
as may be necessary., 161  Thus, when the Security Council
determines that a threat to international peace exists but cannot
extinguish it due to lack of resources or will, a coalition of
Permanent Members may take action as long as all Permanent
Members have consulted with one another.
With the adoption of Resolution 688, there existed a threat to
international peace, consultation among the Permanent Members,
and a lack of uniform will by the Permanent Members to use force
to protect Iraqi civilians. Accordingly, one could argue that a
coalition of less than five Permanent Members should have
possessed the authority to take action on behalf of the Security
Council. This approach would enable Article 106 to respond to
Security Council paralysis rather than to mirror it.162 Until now,
however, Security Council members have never voted to adopt
resolutions while acknowledging that any threat determination
authorizes independent joint-enforcement action by Permanent
Members. While this approach could justify imposition and
159. Id.
160. Interview with Captain Thomas J. Connelly, Deputy Legal Counsel, U.S. Navy,
Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Mar. 25, 1993).
161. U.N. CHARTER art. 106.
162. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
345-46 (1983) (stating that no intervention is possible when the Security Council is
paralyzed by a Permanent Member's veto).
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enforcement of no-fly zones, it cannot justify the Iraqi no-fly
zones.
4. Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention
a. An Emerging Rule of Law?
Much, if not all, of the motivation behind the Iraqi no-fly zones
is a humanitarian desire to protect Iraqi civilians from repression
by their government in Baghdad 63 The doctrine of Humanitari-
an intervention, therefore, presents another possible justification
for the Iraqi no-fly zones.1 In the nineteenth century, states
reserved the right to intervene militarily in other states' affairs to
protect persons under the latter state's control. 65 There is
disagreement whether this doctrine reflected customary interna-
tional law."6  The influence of this doctrine in the twentieth
century further eroded with the adoption of the Charter in
1945.167
While the Charter does not expressly prohibit unilateral
humanitarian intervention, Article 2(4) provides that "[aIll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."' 6  There is considerable disagree-
ment over the extent to which this provision undercuts the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 169
163. The northern no-fly zone was part of a larger "safe haven," which the United
States declared was necessary to protect both civilians and aircraft delivering humanitarian
relief. Sciolino, supra note 2, at A10. The southern zone was imposed in response to
reports of an impending Iraqi offensive on Shiites in the marshes of southern Iraq.
Gordon, supra note 3, at A6. United Kingdom Prime Minister John Major stated that the
zone was necessary to prevent the "systematic murder" of Iraqi Shiites. Gordon, supra
note 80, at Al, A6.
164. Intervention here refers to dictatorial interference, or forcing a state to behave in
a certain manner under the threat or use of force. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note
161, at 338-42.
165. Id. at 338; BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 564-65.
166. Nafziger, supra note 84, at 24-25.
167. Id.
168. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4; BROWNLIE, supra note 161, at 341-42 (stating that the
adoption of the United Nations Charter effectively terminated the doctrine of humanitari-
an intervention).
169. See Gordon, supra note 93, at 530-31. State practice supports the view of many
authorities that unilateral intervention by a state to rescue its own nationals within the
target state is a legal use of force. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed
Force, 82 MiCH. L. REV. 1620, 1629, 1641 (1984); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
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One analysis, supported by the International Court of Jus-
tice,170 contends that non-intervention is a rule of customary
international law and that intervention without state consent is
almost certainly illegal.17' This view recognizes that any inter-
vention, even for humanitarian purposes, will inevitably impact the
target state's territorial integrity and political independence. 172
Indeed, the establishment of safe havens in Iraqi Kurdistan has
had a similar effect: the creation of a Kurdish quasi-state in Iraqi
territory.173  Moreover, the exclusion of a target state's aircraft
from its territorial airspace undermines its territorial integrity and
political independence. Under this analysis, humanitarian
intervention does not legally justify the Iraqi no-fly zones.
Nevertheless, a growing number of commentators believe that
humanitarian intervention is a proper response to gross, persistent,
and systematic human rights abuses. 74 They argue that states'
obligation to human rights 75 is at least consistent with the non-
intervention principle. Therefore, the use of force in defense of
human rights would not violate the prohibition on force.176 These
proponents of the non-intervention principle further argue that as
long as these interventions are necessary, are motivated by
humanitarian concerns, and require only a reasonable level of
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 703 cmt. e, n.8 (1987). But cf.
BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 301 (arguing that such intervention is illegal). Necessity,
proportionality, and immediacy limit this right, if it exists. Nafziger, supra note 84, at 39.
170. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 263 (June 27).
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS RELATIONS LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 19, § 703 cmt. e, n.8; BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 341-42,
346-47; Schachter, supra note 168, at 1629; Jost Delbruck, Commentary on International
Law: A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United
Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 890 (1992); Nafziger, supra note 84, at 24-25.
172. BROWNLIE, supra note 161, at 267-68; Schachter, supra note 168, at 1641.
173. John Darnton, Almost a Nation: The Kurds in Iraq-A Special Report.; Kurds
Rebuilding Shattered Land, Winning a Precarious Autonomy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1994,
at Al.
174. OPPENHEIM, supra, note 19, at 312-21; Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq,
Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under
International Law-Part 1, 20 DENV. J. INT'L & POL'Y 305,310 (1992); Kevin Ryan, Rights,
Intervention, and Self-Determination, 20 DENY. J. INT'L & POL'Y 55, 59 (1991). Ryan also
argues that protecting a peoples' right to self-determination, a goal of the Kurdish people,
can justify humanitarian intervention. See id. at 61-66.
175. See U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
176. Id. art. 2, 4.
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force, they do not violate "territorial integrity and political
independence.,
177
One commentator argues that the Coalition's intervention in
Iraqi Kurdistan satisfies these criteria.17  The intervention,
necessary to save the lives of civilians, 179 was purely humanitari-
an180 and employed the minimum force necessary to protect both
civilians and intervening troops.' Moreover, the intervention
was temporary.' 8 A similar argument might justify the imposi-
tion and enforcement of the southern zone.
A closer analysis of the facts, however, reveals weaknesses in
this argument. First, the no-fly zones are not U.N. operations and
are examples of long-term intervention.8 3  Second, the interven-
tion interfered with Iraq's territorial integrity and political
independence. Iraqi Kurdistan is nearly a de facto state with an
internal government, population, and roughly-defined territory
over which Baghdad exercises little or no control." Third, the
no-fly zones themselves deprive Iraq of the use of a portion of its
sovereign airspace. Finally, the states enforcing the no-fly zones
have implied that the zones will not end until Iraq's government
changes." These facts demonstrate that the Coalition interven-
tion in Iraq, including the no-fly zones, violates the non-interven-
tion principle embodied in Article 2(4).
There is no question, however, that as a matter of humanitarian
policy, the Coalition's intervention and the imposition of the no-fly
zones saved Iraqi lives and eliminated a threat to international
peace. A passionate advocate of the doctrine recently lamented
177. For an explanation of these criteria, see Nanda, supra note 173, at 330; Ryan,
supra note 173, at 66-70.
178. Nanda, supra note 173, at 330-34.
179. Id. at 332.
180. Id. at 331.
181. Cowell, supra note 82, at A8.
182. Eric Schmitt, Last Troops Begin Withdrawing From Northern Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1991, at L3.
183. At the time of publication, the northern Iraqi no-fly zone has existed for more
than three and one half years. The southern Iraqi no-fly zone has existed for more than
two years.
184. Darnton, supra note 172, at Al.
185. The United States claims that full compliance with Security Council resolutions
does not require the removal of Saddam Hussein; nevertheless, it views full compliance as
impossible as a practical matter under Hussein because full compliance means ending the
oppression that the United States sees as central to Hussein's rule. See Lewis, supra note
119.
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that current international law prevents assistance to victims of
large-scale human rights abuses and stated: "If international law is
to aid in the foundation of a new world order, it ... must focus
... on securing just relations among peoples and their govern-
ments, rather than on maintaining the inviolability of statesovereignty.'""8
Certainly, international law has restricted states' ability to
mistreat their peoples as well as state sovereignty. State sovereign-
ty, however, is the foundation of the international legal regime and
has not eroded to the extent that a foreign power may force
rearrangement of the relations between a sovereign state and its
citizens." 7
Recent state practice suggests that states do not recognize a
right of unilateral humanitarian intervention. In late 1992, the
United States received Security Council approval before dispatch-
ing forces into Somalia to end starvation.1" In 1994, France
waited for Security Council approval, and sought the cooperation
of other states, before deploying troops into Rwanda to stop mass
killings of Rwandans by the controlling Hutu tribe.189 In the
same year, the United States obtained Security Council authoriza-
tion and multinational cooperation before occupying Haiti to
remove a military dictatorship, an action motivated partly by
humanitarian concerns.19° The uncertain status of the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention demonstrates that the doctrine is not
yet an accepted rule of customary law. At most, it represents a
movement toward an emerging rule and thus does not justify
unilateral imposition of no-fly zones in Iraq.
Even assuming that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
became established as a rule of international law, such a rule could
186. Paul W. Kahn, Lesson for International Law from the Gulf War, 45 STAN. L. REV.
425, 440 (1993).
187. Schachter, supra note 168, at 1629.
188. Michael R. Gordon, U.N. Backs A Somalia Force As Bush Vows A Swift Exit;
Pentagon Sees Longer Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al; Michael Wines, Bush
Declares Goal in Somalia to 'Save Thousands', N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1992, at Al.
189. France Says It Will Send Intervention Force to Rwandan Border, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 1994, at 11; Richard D. Lyons, French Officer Is First Step Toward a Multinational
Force, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1994, at A8.
190. Douglas Jehl, Clinton Seeks U.N. Approval Of Any Plan to Invade Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1994, at Al; Richard D. Lyons, U.N. Authorizes Invasion Of Haiti To Be
Led By US., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at Al; Clinton's Speech: The Reasons Why, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1994, at A5.
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not legally justify the existence of the Iraqi no-fly zones. Iraq
objected to the zones from their inception as a violation of its
sovereignty. 91 Therefore, as an original and persistent objector,
it is exempt from its application."l
b. Security Council Humanitarian Intervention
If humanitarian intervention is emerging as a legitimate
instrument of international law, its exercise should be limited to
the collective international community.193 In the past, powerful
individual states have cynically abused the doctrine, disguising their
self-interests with international humanitarian motives.94 The
Security Council is the only international body with the legitimacy
and political accountability to determine that a state's sovereignty
may be violated to protect that state's nationals.1 95 Prevention
of unilateral intervention will preserve the principle of sovereignty
that has marked the international rule of law to date.1
96
4. Occupation Authority
Once the Coalition established itself in Iraqi airspace, it
assumed certain obligations to persons within the zones. Military
occupation is defined as control of territory by an outside power
without consent."9 An occupier at the end of hostilities has legal
191. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Iraq, Assailing Bush's Plan, Says U.N. Will Open Camps,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at A16.
192. BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 533.
193. See Louis B. Sohn, How New Is the New International Legal Order?, 20 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 205, 210 (1992) (stating that unilateral humanitarian intervention would
be legal when authorized by the Security Council).
194. BROWNLIE, supra note 161, at 339-41; BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 564-65. Nazi
Germany, for example, cited concern for the well-being of ethnic Germans in bordering
states to justify, in part, its territorial acquisitions in Austria and Czechoslovakia. WILLIAM
L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 332-33 (1959). For other examples
of unilateral interventions justified at least partly on humanitarian grounds, see Nanda,
supra note 173, at 311-30.
195. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, International Law Governing Aid to Opposition
Groups in Civil War: Resurrecting the Standards of Belligerency, 63 WASH. L. REV. 43, 51
(1988); EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE, Summary and Interpretation, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF CIVIL WAR 421 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971); Schachter, supra note 34, at 469.
196. Delbruck, supra note 170, at 891.
197. Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories
Since 1967, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 44 (1990).
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authority in all territory over which it exercises effective con-
trol.' 98
Before the formal end of hostilities on April 6, 1991, and after
the cease-fire agreement came into effect, the Coalition sent
aircraft and troops to protect the establishment of humanitarian
relief camps199 With the withdrawal of Iraqi troops and aircraft
from northern Iraq, the Coalition exercised effective control as
occupier both in the air and on the ground.2" Coalition forces
also occupied much of southern Iraq at the end of the war.2"' As
long as Coalition forces exercised effective control in northern
Iraq, the Coalition, as occupier, restricted access to Iraqi air-
space' 02 and thus exerted and bore the powers and obligations of
an occupier over that territory.
Occupiers must ensure that persons within occupied territories
are "at all times humanely treated, and ... protected especially
against all acts of violence or threats thereof,"' 3 and must "bring
in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the
resources of the occupied territory are inadequate."2' Accord-
ingly, the Coalition had an affirmative duty to protect Iraqi
civilians in Coalition-controlled territory and to provide humanitar-
ian assistance. Any measures, including the imposition of a no-fly
zone, the use of force to protect civilians, and the supply of
humanitarian assistance, were permissible pursuant to the
Coalition's role as occupier.
The Coalition granted control of both the northern2 5 and
198. For a general discussion of occupation power, see GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE
OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (1957).
199. Clifford Krauss, U.S. Will Airdrop Food and Clothes to Kurds In Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1991, at Al, A5; see Cowell, supra note 190, at A16.
200. Chuck Sudetic, Iraqi Forces Begin Pullback In North As The Camps Rise, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1991, at Al, A8.
201. Coalition forces occupied southern Iraq up to the Euphrates River. See Michael
R. Gordon, G.Ls In Iraq Start Moving To A Zone Bordering Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
1991, at Al, A8.
202. See GLAHN, supra note 197, at 29-30 (stating that loss of physical control over
territory ends occupation and legal effect of occupation orders).
203. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of August 12, 1949, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR 272 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1982) [hereinafter Geneva Convention
Iv].
204. Id. art. 55.
205. Schmitt, supra note 181, at 1U; Cowell, supra note 190, at A16; Elaine Sciolino,
Iraq and UN. to Carve Out Routes In Plan to Speed Refugees' Return, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
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southern safe havens to the United Nations.2 Airspace, howev-
er, is considered territory; thus, a no-fly zone arguably constitutes
occupied territory even if the sovereign controls the land below the
zone.207  Therefore, once the Coalition established effective
control in Iraqi airspace, Iraqi sovereignty would be suspended for
the duration of that occupation. Accordingly, imposition of the
Iraqi no-fly zones arguably constituted a proper exercise of
occupation authority.
As stated before, an occupier of territory over which it
exercises control at the end of hostilities establishes its authority
over that territory.' ° Once the Coalition took control of Iraqi
airspace, it could shoot down Iraqi aircraft and was obligated to do
so when necessary to protect Iraqi civilians.2' That analysis,
however, does not justify the Coalition's presence in Iraqi airspace.
An occupier's management of an illegal occupation must neverthe-
less comply with international humanitarian law.21°
Occupations are normally transitional measures at the end of
armed conflict. 211  The Iraqi no-fly zones, particularly the three-
and-one-half-year-old northern zone, are approaching the status of
a prolonged occupation.2 2 The duration of such occupations
apparently depends on the longevity of the governing regime.2 3
As long as the Coalition maintains effective control over airspace,
it assumes trustee obligations for the well-being of the persons
therein.214
19, 1991, at Al, A8. This agreement, however, did not provide for the introduction of
United Nations troops into northern Iraq. Schachter, supra note 34, at 469.
206. Edward A. Gargan, Control in South Iraq Passes To U.N. In a Symbolic Move,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1991 at A13.
207. GLAHN, supra note 197, at 28, 31.
208. Id. at 28.
209. This view is shared by Allan Gerson, Chief Counsel of the United States Mission
to the United Nations under President Ronald Reagan. Gerson, however, does not appear
to distinguish between the Coalition's occupation power at the end of hostilities and that
status after the United Nations assumed power. See Lewis, supra note 137, at A4.
210. Roberts, supra note 196, at 46.
211. Id. at 47.
212. One commentator defines prolonged occupation as an occupation lasting more
than five years in duration. Id at 47. Customary law, however, places no outside limit on
the length of an occupation. Id.
213. Occupations normally end after a gradual period of emergence of indigenous
political institutions able to assume sovereign control. Id. at 102. The question in the case
of Iraq, particularly in the northern zone, is whether that sovereignty will be exercised by
Iraqis or Kurds.
214. Id. at 68.
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5. Summary
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the weak legal founda-
tion upon which the no-fly zones in Iraq rest and their inapplicabil-
ity as a model for the imposition and enforcement of future no-fly
zones. The veto power of the Coalition will probably deter the
Security Council from taking action to lift the zones until the
Coalition decides to lift them. The recent decision in the Libya
case, however, indicates that the International Court of Justice
may become the interpreter of Security Council resolutions.
215
If Iraq can obtain jurisdiction, this court might review Coalition
actions based on both Security Council resolutions and customary
international law.
216
Although policy reasons may justify the Iraqi no-fly zones,
determination of the legality of their imposition and enforcement
depends upon their applicability in other situations. Syria, for
example, was a member of a group of states authorized by
Resolution 678 to use force to liberate Kuwait.217 The view that
the Coalition's zones are legally valid must also recognize the right
of Syria, or any of the other states that assisted Kuwait, to impose
an indefinite, unilateral no-fly zone or other measures necessary to
protect Iraqi civilians. Such a right could lead to an international
"free-for-all" in which states may unilaterally determine what is
best for their neighbors.2 8 The international system of law that
deters the use of force against state sovereignty must not be
undermined by a policy of expediency. When the international
community desires to invade a state's sovereignty by establishing
a no-fly zone in order to protect that state's nationals, it should
follow the model of the Bosnian zone.
215. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1991 I.C.J. 114, Request for
the Indication of Provisional Measures, General List No. 89 (Order of Apr. 14), implicitly
claiming the power of judicial review over a chapter VII decision of the U.N. Security
Council.
216. Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who Is the Ultimate Guardian
of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519, 523 (1992).
217. WESTON, supra note 105, at 525.
218. Professor Thomas M. Franck warns of a "recipe for chaos" if this model becomes
precedent. See Lewis, supra note 137.
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IV. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The establishment of a no-fly zone does not suspend the
application of the laws of war within the zone.1 9 Regardless of
the legality of the particular zone, the enforcers and challengers of
no-fly zones are bound by treaties and customary international
law.22 This section will examine whether the Coalition and Iraq
have complied with the applicable laws of war.
A. Enforcement in Iraq
1. Relevant Laws of Air Warfare
The Coalition has, on several occasions, aggressively enforced
the Iraqi no-fly zones. The majority of Coalition enforcement
measures over Iraq have involved air warfare. The international
community has failed to adhere to the two major efforts to codify
a comprehensive set of rules governing air warfare. Although The
Rules of Aerial Warfare 22t were never adopted in legally binding
form, they were regarded as an authoritative attempt to clarify and
formulate rules of air warfare.22 Nevertheless, these rules were
219. Air exclusion zones operate in much the same manner as the maritime exclusion
zone established by the United Kingdom around the Falklands-Malvinas Islands during its
1982 war with Argentina. This maritime zone served as "an officially declared combat
zone" that essentially warned ships not to enter the zone. HILAIRE McCOUBREY,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 154 (1990). This zone did not "create an area
within which the laws of armed conflict are suspended, especially in relation to neutral and
protected shipping." Id. The difference between the United Kingdom's maritime exclusion
zone and an air exclusion zone is that the latter exists over a state's sovereign territory.
Under the rules of warfare, an air exclusion zone established by competent authority
would expose an aircraft within it to attack if that aircraft would have normally been so
exposed during armed conflict in the absence of a zone. It would not, however, expose
an aircraft that was protected during armed conflict to attack, simply because the craft
entered the zone. See also SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 400-01 (offering an analogy to
maritime exclusion zones).
220. See Schachter, supra note 34, at 466 (stating that the laws of war apply to attackers
and defenders alike).
221. Rules of Aerial Warfare, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra
note 202, at 123-35 [hereinafter Hague Rules].
222. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 202, at 121. See also W. Hays
Parks, Air War and the Law of War, A.F. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990). But see William J. Fenrick,
The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91,
95 (1982); SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 42-43; INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF
ARMED CONFLIC' AND AIR OPERATIONS, supra note 68, paras. 5-11 (all stating that the
Hague Rules have the force of the eminence of their drafters).
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largely ignored by the states during World War II.3 Represen-
tatives of sixty-eight states224 signed the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts ("Protocol
I").225 Protocol I, however, does not reflect general state prac-
tice."
Despite the absence of comprehensive rules, three general
principles of humanitarian law should govern the Coalition's
enforcement of no-fly zones. First, customary international law
permits attacks on targets of military importance wherever they
are located.227 Second, civilians may not be the target of direct
attack.2' Third, the possible loss of civilian lives must be consid-
ered in determining whether to attack.229
The 1907 Fourth Hague Convention ("Hague IV"), to which all
of the Coalition members are parties, prohibits the bombardment
of undefended targets.3 The 1907 Ninth Hague Convention
("Hague IX") introduced the principle that the legitimacy of a
target depends on the extent to which it "could be utilized for the
needs of" the enemy.31 This principle, though first stated in a
treaty on naval bombardment, now reflects customary international
law that governs targeting in general and replaces the defended-
undefended test. 32
223. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 202, at 122.
224. Id. at 459-60.
225. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Aug. 12, 1949, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 202, at 389-446 [hereinafter Protocol I].
226. Parks, supra note 220, at 224 (stating that the drafters of Protocol I mistakenly
endeavored to resurrect the failed provisions of the 1923 Hague Air Rules and that it is
unlikely that its efforts to regulate the conduct of hostilities will meet with any greater
degree of success than did the 1923 Hague Air Rules).
227. Id. at 18.
228. OPPENHEIM, supra note 19, at 524; Parks, supra note 220, at 31, 55; Fenrick, supra
note 220, at 93-94.
229. Parks, supra note 229, at 45.
230. Annex to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 22, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 202, at 52; SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 221.
231. Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, Oct.
18, 1907, art. 2, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 202, at 95
[hereinafter Hague Convention IX]; see Paul Whitcomb Williams, Legitimate Targets in
Aerial Bombardment, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 570, 571 (1929).
232. Fenrick, supra note 220, at 93-94; Parks, supra note 220, at 177; Williams, supra
note 229, at 573.
[Vol. 17:35
No-Fly Zones
Ironically, the Hague Rules and Protocol I, which generally do
not reflect customary international law, expressly prohibit direct
attacks on civilians, whereas treaties applicable to Coalition
enforcers do not.23 Hague IV provides only that "[t]he right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimit-
ed."'  Geneva IV states that protected persons "shall at all
times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially
against all acts of violence or threats thereof," but applies only to
those "in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals."235 Nevertheless, state practice
indicates that direct attacks on civilians are contrary to customary
international law.
236
The third principle, consideration of potential civilian casualties,
is difficult to state with precision. Customary international law
accepts the inevitability of civilian casualties in armed conflict. 7
Humanitarian principles, however, require that civilians be immune
from being the targets of direct attacks during armed conflict. 8
International law demands more than mere absence of intent to
attack civilians; it requires states to consider the fate of civilians
when deciding on the means and method of attack. 9
Commentators have described this principle as proportionali-
ty,24° or "ordinary care" to avoid civilian casualties. 241  Modem
233. Article 22 of the Hague Rules provides: "Aerial bombardment for the purpose of
terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of
military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited." Hague Rules, art. 22,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 202, at 126. Protocol I
provides: "The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack." Protocol I, art. 51(2), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 202, at 415.
234. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
art. 22, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 202, at 52. Protocol
I reiterates this prohibition. Protocol I, art. 35, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR, supra note 202, at 409.
235. Geneva Convention IV, arts. 4, 27, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 202, at 273-74, 284.
236. William J. Fenrick, Legal Aspects of Targeting in the Law of Naval Warfare, 28
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 238, 239 (1991).
237. Hague Convention IX imposes no liability for "unavoidable" civilian damage.
Hague Convention IX, art. 2, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
202, at 95. One commentator suggests that such "unavoidable" damage is an acceptable
consequence of war. Fenrick, supra note 220, at 92.
238. Id. at 93.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 94.
241. Parks, supra note 220, at 31.
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humanitarian law requires parties to a military conflict to consider
potential civilian casualties that may result from an attack on a
military target.242 It urges the planner to forgo a particular
method of attack if it results in a direct attack on civilians.
4 3
Therefore, pursuant to this principle, the propriety and perhaps
even the legality of the attack are brought into question if civilian
casualties exceed the military benefit gained.
a. Aerial Combat
Coalition aircraft have enforced the Iraqi no-fly zones by
shooting down Iraqi warplanes that have penetrated them.2 "
These actions do not violate any laws of war; during armed
conflict, military aircraft are always legitimate targets for at-
tack.245 Furthermore, as long as a military attack does not affect
civilian aircraft, any force used to overcome military aircraft is
legal.246
The Coalition's approach toward "medical aircraft" in the no-
fly zones complied with humanitarian law. Military action by the
Coalition to force Iraqi compliance with the no-fly zone constitutes
"armed conflict" between states, triggering the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions2 7 that protect medical aircraft.' En-
242. Compare Fenrick, supra note 220, at 94, 125 (stating that regardless of whether
proportionality is customary law, it is the necessary balancing step between the rule
permitting attacks on military objectives and the rule prohibiting direct attacks on civilians)
with Parks, supra note 220, at 168, 173 (stating that, while proportionality is not customary
law, it is "a part of the law of war"). See also Williams, supra note 229, at 571 (arguing
for a "double test" of military expediency balanced with humanitarian interests).
243. Fenrick, supra note 220, at 94.
244. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Shoots Down an Iraqi Warplane In No-Flight Zone, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at Al, All [hereinafter Gordon, U.S. Shoots Down]; Michael R.
Gordon, Bush Launches Missile Attack On A Baghdad Industrial Park As Washington
Greets Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at A8 [hereinafter Gordon, Bush Launches].
In one "friendly-fire" incident, U.S. jets, enforcing the northern zone, shot down two U.S.
helicopters mistaken for Iraqi helicopters. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Jets Over Iraq Attack
Own Helicopters In Error, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at Al.
245. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR
OPERATIONS, supra note 68, 1 4-1; Parks, supra note 220, at 177.
246. Parks, supra note 220, at 170.
247. Geneva Convention IV, art. 2, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 202, at 272-73.
248. "Medical aircraft... shall not be attacked ... while flying at heights, times and
on routes specifically agreed upon between the belligerent concerned." Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 36, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR, supra note 202, at 184.
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forcement of the no-fly zones may not include attacks on designat-
ed medical aircraft flying over the zones pursuant to authorized
flight plans.24 9 Medical aircraft, however, may not fly over
enemy territory without prior agreement.250 The fact that Iraqi
medical aircraft flying over the no-fly zones do not actually fly
over "enemy territory" raises the question of whether this
prohibition applies.
Military commanders always have the right to establish
"restriction zones" around their forces.251 If any aircraft ap-
proaches or enters these zones without permission, military
commanders may shoot down these aircraft, with or without
warning." Regardless of the legality of the zones, Iraq must
take heed for the safety of medical aircraft entering the zones. In
any case, the Coalition has exceeded its responsibility in this area,
allowing an Iraqi helicopter to rescue a downed pilot in the
southern zone.253
b. Attacks On Anti-aircraft Defenses
The Coalition attacked Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries and radar
that fired upon or illuminated Coalition aircraft.254 Anti-aircraft
batteries are legitimate targets in combat zones.255 Some of
these attacks may have resulted in civilian casualties, bringing into
play the principles of targeting that protect civilians. Nevertheless,
249. Id.
250. "Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy occupied territory are
prohibited." Id.
251. SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 400-01.
252. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR
OPERATIONS, supra note 68, at 4-1, 4-2, 4-7 n.20.
253. Gordon, U.S. Shoots Down, supra note 242, at Al, All.
254. Gordon, Bush Launches, supra note 242, at A8; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Leads
Further Attacks On Iraqi Antiaircraft Sites; Admits Its Missile Hit Hotel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 1993, Al, A8 [hereinafter Gordon, U.S. Leads]; Michael R. Gordon, Under Standing
Orders, U.S. Jets Hit Iraq: Radar Seen As Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1993, at Al, A6;
Elaine Sciolino, New Iraqi Site Raided As White House Vows Firmness, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 1993, at L3; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Plane Bombs on Iraqi Gun Position, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 1993, at L14; Eric Schmitt, Iraqi Gunners Fire On American Jets In North, U.S.
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1993, at Al, AS; Douglas Jehl, US. Jet Patrolling Iraq Fires
Missile at Artillery Site, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,1993, at A3; Stephen Engelberg, Another U.S.
Jet on Patrol Fires at Iraqi Antiaircraft Battery, July 26, 1993, N.Y. TIMES at A6; Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Bombs Iraqis For Firing At Jets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A8.
255. See INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR
OPERATIONS, supra note 68, at 4-1 (stating that attacks on missile batteries are legal
outside neutral zones).
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the attacks are legal because they meet the tests of military
necessity and consideration of civilian casualties.
The mere presence of civilians in the vicinity of a military
target does not immunize that target from attack. 6  Moreover,
responsibility for civilian deaths resulting from those attacks rests
upon Iraq, which has the primary responsibility to protect its
civilians under customary international law.27
Even under the more demanding standards of Protocol I,
attacks on anti-aircraft defenses would be legal. Protocol I
prohibits "indiscriminate attacks." This provision may not apply
to an attack on a single battery because Protocol I defines an
"indiscriminate attack" as one "which treats as a single military
objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military
objectives."" Attacks on sparsely populated areas would not
be affected by this provision because indiscriminate attacks only
include attacks directed at targets "located in a city, town, village,
or other area containing a similar concentration of civilian or
civilian objects." 9
Assuming the provisions apply, the attacks on the batteries
would be legal under Protocol I. Attacks on anti-aircraft batteries
provide enforcers of air exclusion zones with definite and measur-
able advantages because such attacks enable the enforcers to
protect themselves and, at the same time, ensure that the inviola-
bility of the zone is directly proportional to the ability of the
defender to attack aircraft. The resulting civilian casualties do not
rise to the level of "excessive," which one commentator defines as
"as much as or more than severe,"'  or "indiscriminate"'261 has
been defined as causing "considerable and widespread incidental
damage to the civilian population," out of proportion to the
military objective gained. 2 Moreover, anti-aircraft defenses may
be attacked regardless of their stage of operation because they are
always a military target and potentially adversarial.
256. "The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or
areas immune from military operations." Geneva Convention IV art. 28, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 202, at 283.
257. Parks, supra note 220, at 112.
258. Protocol I art. 51, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
202, at 416.
259. Id.
260. Fenrick, supra note 220, at 111.
261. SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 230, 277.
262. Id.
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If imposition and enforcement of the Iraqi no-fly zones were
not supported by international law, attacks on Coalition aircraft
would still be lawful exercises of the right to self-defense.23 If
the zones were legal, Iraqi resistance would violate the dictate of
the Security Council. Regardless of the status of the no-fly zones,
however, the means and methods employed by the Iraqis in their
resistance to the zones must be examined according to the laws of
war.
26
The Iraqi attacks on Coalition aircraft are perfectly legal as a
matter of humanitarian law. Military aircraft are always legitimate
targets of attack. Should the Iraqi political and military leaders be
tried before a war crimes tribunal, they would not be convicted of
war crimes as a result of those attacks.
2. Naval Bombardment: The Zaafaraniya Cruise Missile Attack
On January 17, 1993, the United States launched more than
forty Tomahawk cruise missiles from ships in the Persian Gulf in
an attack on a suspected weapons factory eight miles southeast of
Baghdad. 65 One missile slammed into a Baghdad hotel, killing
three civilians. 266 The United States claimed that the missile that
killed the Baghdad civilians had been shot down by Iraqi anti-
aircraft fire as it was passing over Baghdad on its way to the
Zaafaraniya complex and that the explosion was caused by the
missile's fuel.267 Iraq charged that the Al Rashid Hotel was the
missile's target and that the missile detonated upon impact.2 8
a. Law Applicable to the Coalition
A factory is a military objective and is, therefore, a legitimate
target for naval bombardment under Hague IX and customary
263. States may fire upon intentional military intruders who fly into sovereign airspace
without warning and without request to land. See Phelps, supra note 108, at 292.
264. One commentator suggests that the existence of the no-fly zones is an indication
that Iraq and the Coalition are still at war. See Kahn, supra note 185, at 425.
265. Gordon, Bush Launches, supra note 242, at A8. The attack coincided with attacks
on surface-to-air missile batteries and radar in the northern zone that fired upon or
illuminated Coalition aircraft. Id.
266. Gordon, U.S. Leads, supra note 252, at Al, A8.
267. Id.; Eric Schmitt, Path of U.S. Missiles Brings Debate About Their Ability, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1993, at A8. At least one commentator notes that, according to
humanitarian law, attackers are not to be held responsible for deaths to civilians caused
by their government's defense efforts. See Parks, supra note 220, at 177.
268. Baghdad Again Feels War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at A8.
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international law. Nevertheless, the manner of attack by the
United States undermines the legality of the attack.
In a purely military sense, the attack did not relate to the
enforcement of the no-fly zones. The factory was outside both no-
fly zones and had no military impact on the Coalition's ability to
enforce the zones. 69  Moreover, the circumstances surrounding
the factory had more to do with the inspection regime than the no-
fly zones.
2 7°
U.S. efforts to force compliance with the inspection regime
were imperceptibly linked with its efforts to enforce the no-fly
zones, however. Iraq's interference with the activities of United
Nations weapons inspectors coincided with attacks on Coalition
aircraft by antiaircraft batteries stationed within the zones.27'
The United States claimed that the attack was part of a
demonstration of its commitment to force Iraqi compliance with
Security Council resolutions.272 The failure to distinguish be-
tween enforcement of the inspections regime and the no-fly zones
suggests that, politically, the attack was meant to both goals.
Indeed, the Zaafaraniya attack occurred only days after a Coalition
attack on antiaircraft batteries in the southern zone that hit only
half their targets. That performance was widely viewed as a
demonstration of the Coalition's limitations and of Iraq's ability to
violate the no-fly zones. 73 The Zaafaraniya attack was part of
a strategy designed to enforce the no-fly zones, in addition to its
other goals.274
269. The United States claimed that the factory was part of Iraq's nuclear weapons
program; Iraq said it produced molds and dies. Gordon, supra note 242, at A8; Gordon,
U.S. Leads, supra note 252, at Al, A8.
270. After the attack by journalists, some international jurists expressed their view that
the United States had the authority under Security Council Resolutions 707 and 715 to
attack the Zaafaraniya site. Paul Lewis, US. Is Broadening Enforcement Role, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at A8.
271. Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Refuses to Assure the Safety Of Inspectors' Flights in
South, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1993, at Al.
272. Id.
273. Ironically, the attack may have had a political effect opposite of the effect that was
intended. Previously-united international and Coalition support for military action against
Iraq suffered a setback after the attack. Russia and France expressed concern over the
death of civilians; Russia called for a special meeting of the Security Council. Paul Lewis,
US.-Led Raids On Iraq Strain Unity of Gulf War Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1993, at
A1, A10. The Arab league expressed its regret about the escalation of violence. Youssef
M. Ibrahim, Arabs Protesting Attacks On Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1993, at All.
274. See Michael R. Gordon, Raids On Iraq: Few Choices For Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1993, at A10.
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b. A Protocol I Analysis
Under Protocol I, the legality of the Zaafaraniya attack would
be suspect. Protocol I requires that military planners
take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods
of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to
civilian objects; and refrain from deciding to launch any attack
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians ... which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.2 75
An analysis under these provisions raises two concerns. First,
the United States sent its cruise missiles over Baghdad even
though the Zaafaraniya factory was eight miles south of the city.
This path was not the only one available. If the missiles were sent
over uninhabited territory, however, the accuracy of the attack
would have been diminished.276 Although the destruction of the
hotel was caused by anti-aircraft fire, it could have been caused by
a malfunctioning missile.277
U.S. commanders had to consider the risk posed to Baghdad
civilians by the flight path27 and the importance of destroying
the Zaafaraniya factory.279 The fact that an alternate, militarily-
feasible flight path to the Zaafavaniya factory existed signifies that
the damage caused by the hit at the Al Rashid was avoidable.
275. Protocol I art. 57, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
202, at 420.
276. Tomahawk cruise missiles are guided by comparison of on-board digital maps and
photographs with the terrain of their flight paths. Their most favorable routes are urban
settings. The variable altitude readings of buildings are easier for the missile to follow
than are flat, featureless territory, such as the alternate route to the factory. Schmitt,
supra note 265, at A8.
277. See D.P. O'Connell, The Legality of Naval Cruise Missiles, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 785,
794 (1972) (stating that cruise missiles pose a threat to civilians that imposes a responsibili-
ty upon attackers to exercise "maximum restraint" to minimize civilian exposure and raises
the question of liability under international law in the case of casualty to innocent
bystanders).
278. The Al Rashid missile was almost certainly shot down by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire,
a predictable risk to military planners; missile malfunction also poses a risk to the civilian
population. For example, one of the missiles targeted at Zaafaraniya malfunctioned and
fell into the sea. See Schmitt, supra note 265, at A8.
279. U.S. officials recognized the decreased risk to civilians posed by a south and west
route to Zaafaraniya but claimed that the attack's overall accuracy outweighed the risk to
civilians. Some experts, including military experts, stated that convenience of guidance
motivated the planners' choice and that the Baghdad route was a mistake. Id.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Second, while customary law recognizes that military advantage
may result from attacks with political or psychological effect, 0
Protocol I requires consideration of the "direct and concrete
military advantage" alone.2 1 The principal advantage of the
attack was political, and it resulted in civilian casualties; thus, its
legality is suspect if the Protocol I standard is applied.
The strict military advantage gained by destruction of the
factory alone was negligible. U.S. Defense Secretary Richard B.
Cheney stated that Iraq's overall military structure had been badly
damaged during the war and that sanctions imposed by the
Security Council had limited Iraq's ability to develop weapons of
mass destruction.' Under a Protocol I analysis, the risk to
civilians could outweigh the strict military advantage gained by the
attack.
On the other hand, an analysis applying Protocol I may
legitimize the attack. The operative term in the balancing test is
"excessive." If "excessive" is defined to mean "as much as or
more than severe," the attack does not violate even this stricter
standard. The loss of several civilians, while unfortunate and
undesirable in human terms, cannot be considered "excessive."
Even the possibility of illegality under Protocol I demonstrates
the weakness of the treaty as a standard for humanitarian law. By
placing civilians in the path of an attack, the attacker may violate
humanitarian law. Because humanitarian law serves to protect
civilians, the result of the Zaafaraniya attack is adverse to that
goal.
B. Enforcement in Bosnia
In April 1993, aircraft from the United States, France, and the
Netherlands began enforcing the Bosnian no-fly zone on behalf of
NATO, the Security Council's enforcement agent.' Article 103
280. For examples of lawful attacks, particularly for a comparison with the 1986 U.S.
attack on Libya, whose effect was not strictly military, see Parks, supra note 220, at 141-43.
But see SPAIGHT, supra note 67, at 277 (arguing that bombing for "moral effect" alone is
illegal).
281. Protocol I art. 57, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note
202, at 420.
282. The U.S. Government, however, claimed that the site's potential for the
manufacture of weapons justified the raid. Id.
283. Alan Cowell, NA TO Jets Start to Enforce Ban on Illegal Bosnia Flights, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1993, at A8.
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of the Charter exempts Member Nations from their treaty obliga-
tions "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations Charter. . . and their obligations
under any other international agreement. ' 2" Therefore, if the
Security Council calls on the Member Nation to take action that
would violate a provision of an international humanitarian law
treaty to which the Member is a party, the Member's obligation to
carry out that action should trump its obligation under that treaty.
The Security Council, however, authorized NATO to enforce the
no-fly zone without giving specific instructions as to how to
enforce it.25 Arguably, therefore, the limitations imposed by the
aforementioned treaties and customary international law may
govern the states' actions to enforce the zone.
The rules of engagement governing NATO's enforcement of
the Bosnian no-fly zone permit firing upon military aircraft
violators only after repeated warnings are ignored.' These
rules are consistent with customary international law's treatment
of unintentional military intruders in sovereign airspace in peace-
time.' This approach indicates that the Security Council does
not view itself as a party to the conflict.'
The limitations on NATO enforcement are politically motivat-
ed, not legally based.2 9 These motivations result in the virtual
non-enforcement of the no-fly zone.2" The rationale behind the
establishment and enforcement of the Bosnian zone may provide
a basis for the expansion of the rules of engagement based on the
principle of military necessity.2 91 One of the original goals of the
284. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
285. Lewis, supra note 40, at A3.
286. Gordon, supra note. 135, at A8.
287. See Phelps, supra note 108, at 276.
288. The principle that civilian aircraft should not be shot down is consistent with
customary international law on peacetime intrusion. Id.
289. The no-fly zone itself contemplated more of a political than a military effect.
Lewis, supra note 43, at A3.
290. In February 1994, NATO shot down aircraft that violated the no-fly zone. Michael
R. Gordon, NA TO Craft Down 4 Serb Warplanes Attacking Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
1994, at Al. This incident, however, was an exception, as hundreds of previous violations
went unpunished. Chuck Sudetic, Tough Calls: Enforcing a Flight Ban Over Bosnia, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1993, at A8.
291. Earlier proposals for the enforcement of the zone, in fact, involved more
aggressive rules of engagement, including shooting down violators and bombing Serbian
aircraft on the ground. Michael R. Gordon, Bush Would Use Force to Ban Serbs' War
Flights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992, at Li, L5; William E. Schmidt, Britain Wary of Using
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zone was to help provide a more secure environment for the
delivery of humanitarian assistance.29 The United Nations has
periodically suspended the humanitarian airlift due to the risk
imposed upon military transports from ground attack.293 Some
of that risk results from the use of anti-aircraft fire.294 This risk
justifies attacks on anti-aircraft defense in a fashion similar to the
proposed arguments that justify the enforcement of the Iraqi no-fly
zone.
In March 1993, a United Nations helicopter evacuation of
wounded civilians from a besieged town in eastern Bosnia was
interrupted by artillery fire on the landing site.295  British heli-
copters brought in to evacuate the wounded from the attack were
fired upon by snipers.2% These actions clearly posed a threat to
United Nations aircraft in Bosnian airspace and frustrated the
intent of the no-fly zone itself This threat provided an additional
justification for expanding the rules of engagement. The enforce-
ment authority, as demonstrated by the model of Coalition
enforcement in Iraq, would apply to attacks on all of these targets.
The Zaafaraniya attack demonstrated that the principle of
military necessity may justify an attack that serves a political
purpose. This principle could be used in Bosnia to expand the
rules of engagement to include targets not logically linked to the
enforcement of a no-fly zone. These targets might include military
supply depots, command centers, or artillery sites, whose destruc-
tion may increase respect for the no-fly zones.
297
U.S. Air Power in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at A13. By late 1994, NATO acted
contrary to its restrictive rules of engagement, requesting that the Security Council amend
its mandate to permit wider targeting. Roger Cohen, NATO Requests a Broader Right to
Attack Targets in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1994, at A8.
292. Lewis, supra note 1.
293. See, e.g., John F. Bums, Besieged Bosnians Facing A New Peril As U.N. Aid Dries
Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at Al.
294. Id.
295. Two civilians were killed, and two Canadian peacekeepers wounded. John F.
Bums, Shelling Grounds Bosnia Evacuation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at A3.
296. United Nations officials said the helicopters were "deliberately targeted." Id.
297. The establishment of the United Nations "safe areas" in Bosnia and their
protection by NATO aircraft made expansion of the no-fly zone enforcement rules
unnecessary for this goal. Paul Lewis, U.N. Is Authorizing Allied Airstrikes Against The
Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1993, at Al, A6.
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V. CONCLUSION
While military strategists may prefer to model, future no-fly
zones after those established over Iraq, the Bosnian no-fly zone
offers a better model for legal imposition and enforcement
authorization. The experience of the Bosnian no-fly zone demon-
strates that the imposition and enforcement of this zone constitutes
a legally justifiable exercise of United Nations' power under
international law. The Security Council properly determined that
a threat of international peace existed and that the establishment
of the Bosnian no-fly zone was necessary to maintain the peace.
NATO realized that imposition and enforcement of this no-fly
zone required the approval of the Security Council and waited for
this authorization.
In contrast, legal justification for imposition and enforcement
of the Iraqi no-fly zones has no basis in any resolution adopted by
the Security Council. While the Iraqi no-fly zones have achieved
significant political, military, and humanitarian goals, their
imposition and enforcement cannot be justified under existing
international law. Rather, the Iraqi no-fly zones constituted an
illegal deprivation of Iraqi territorial sovereignty by the Coalition.
The imposition and enforcement of no-fly zones represent both
a breakthrough in international law and a powerful tool in
political-military strategy. Due to their unique characteristics and
capabilities, states will most certainly employ no-fly zones in the
future. Clearly-established rules governing the imposition and
enforcement of no-fly zones must be developed and acknowledged
to ensure their effective and controlled use in the future.
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